2)
These working assumptions, however, are limited with respects to analyzing the formation of Chaebols, after the War, as Chaebols business'behavior was characteristically active, for lack of a better word. To begin, since Korean Chaebols got their business starts in international trade and manufacturing, it is hard to facilitate the argument that these enterprises were simply extensions of enterprises spawned in the Japanese colonial era. As such, we must turn to Korea' s domestic political economy for answers, namely the Syngman Rhee administration' s policies and relations with the US government, for Chaebols continuously sought out opportunities arising from the tension and cooperation between the two countries.
I will first look at the size and scope of the War' s destruction as well as the new market demands and business opportunities arising from the destruction. As this research will evidence, Chaebols started to form precisely in the sectors where demand was the highest. I also will take into account the disposal of ex-Japanese Printing facilities suffered the most damage with 75% being damaged to one extent or another. In terms of total amount of damages, textiles suffered the most, losing about $93 million along with 64% of facilities damaged. In sum, all 7 industries suffered nearly close $115 million in destruction and damage, and loss of raw materials and products.
These figures, however, do not account for smaller factories that were unaccounted for so the figure is most likely higher. Still, while it is accurate to say that the War caused extensive damage to particular industries and businesses, the heaviest damage was inflicted within the first 3 months of the War' s outbreak. At this time, many businesses were ex-Japanese enterprises,
which had yet to be disposed of after Korea' s independence from Japan (August 1945).
In December 1949, The Korean National Assembly passed and put into place the "Act on Ex-Japanese Assets;" 6) but, public purchases of these assets were still considerably low prior to the cease-fire agreement-as of March 1953 only 21 thousand among a total of 292 thousand (or 7% percent) of these enterprises had their assets disposed.
7)
Naturally, the War drastically affected Korea' s macro-economy. There were large runs on bank savings, and the amount of currency in circulation was increased to help finance military expenditures. Worse still, prices increased rapidly owing to transportation and logistic difficulties, destruction of manufacturing lines, paralysis in the distribution of goods and services, and sharp drops in production and circulation.
Notably, the price of consumer products like food and clothing sky rocketed. As table 2 illustrates, the amount currency in circulation rose by 11 times between December 1948
and December 1951; retail prices rose by 15 times during the same period; and, rice prices rose by 17 times. Increases in the amount of currency in circulation after the start of the War were not invested in production but led directly to cornering and hoarding of consumer products and caused price inflation. Additionally, funds from the US went to cover labor costs and consumer goods purchases, deteriorating macroeconomic conditions further.
5) According to ECA studies, in October 1950, it would require at least $46 million to recover Korea' s manufacturing industries back to the pre-war conditions. Korea Development Bank, History of Korean Industry and Economy for Ten Years (1945 Years ( -1955 , pp.180-181. 6) Disposal of ex-Japanese enterprises was put into practice through out the war to stabilize inflation caused by the lack of goods, through sales to civilian of ex-Japanese enterprises to encourage industrial complexes to produce goods for war related causes. During the War, normal business operation was impossible. To begin, most factories were destroyed, and it was difficult start new businesses. While it also holds that there was not enough business in practice at this time to sustain chaebol' s growth. The disposal of ex-Japanese assets, for example, which served as the central foundation for 
Ⅲ. Economic Events and the Formation of Chaebols after the Korean War

Disposal of ex-Japanese enterprises and state-owned assets
The disposal of ex-Japanese enterprises along with land reform became the driving factor for the transfer of wealth from landlords to capitalists; thus signaling the fall of the landlords.
10) The disposal of ex-Japanese assets, which began in 1946, peaked Bank, which were previously state-owned, were privatized, setting the ground for increased shareholders'influence.
11)
One of the main reasons those who took possession of ex-Japanese assets disposal became the core of a new capitalist elite was the rock bottom price they paid for large sums of capital stock and assets. During the War, the ruling government hastened disposal of ex-Japanese assets to help finance war costs. After the War, due to the lack of appropriate capitalists who wanted to participate in the bid, the government' s target price for ex-Japanese assets did not meet the market price. Therefore, receiving disposal itself was considered as a privilege. Additionally, considering the high inflation rate at the time, the longer entrepreneurs took to pay the cost of acquiring these assets, 
Allocation of Relief funds and Exchange Rate Marginal Profit
To receive relief funds from US was quite a privilege in Korea' s skewed wartime economy. Inflation, monopoly, price differences, and exchange rate marginal profits from the big difference between official and real rate set a ground for Chaebols. Relief funds flew to mid to large companies, reinforcing their efforts to grow bigger. Notably, companies that received US dollars from the Korean government made huge exchange rate marginal profits and accumulated further capital by utilizing the dollars in trading. The cotton yarn was unimaginably popular. The set amount was sold to the public at an officially fixed price and the rest was up to Keumsung to freely charge for sale; the price was calculated to have enough profit even at the officially fixed price. Therefore, securing larger amounts to be freely priced would ensure higher profit. Bank interest was due in two years, however, due to the high inflation, repayment was of no difficulty.
Monetary profits were reinvested to enlarge the size the factory. Furthermore, the postwar recovery was yet to be completed; thus, the demand for the textiles was enormous, and if I could get into the military supply chain, demand would be explosive.
16)
The Korean government' s US dollar reserves held from UN loan repayments or from revenues gained by exporting tungsten also served as important factors in the growth of Chaebols. The exchange rate applied to civilian importers generally was the "official' fixed exchange rate, which allowed many firms to reap huge marginal windfalls.
There also is the case of entrepreneurs profiting after taking advantage of the government' s loan policies. The government and state banks divided foreign exchange loans into two types: 1) the first were allocated to wholesale and retail traders and 14) UNKRA, UNKRA Project, Monthly Report, No.24 (October 8, 1954 industries demanding raw materials; 2) the second focused exclusively on the import of capital goods. In both cases, loan amounts were rewarded using a formula including historical export records and real rates of consumption for raw materials.
17) The amounts market interest rates. Naturally, then, those companies with access to the KDB' s coffers, e.g. those companies with a track record of doing business with the government or those working in strategic industries, were benefiting from the low interest rate policy. In the 1950s, private loan rates hovered near 10% monthly whereas parts of ICA and UNKRA loans through KDB stood at 3% monthly. Near the end of 1957 moreover, KDB' s industrial finance loan interest rates were skewed to favor companies borrowing on a grand scale as well as those firms operating in target industries. This also served as a catalyst for particular Chaebols to grow rapidly.
20)
According to Kong Jae-Wook, in the 1950s, 44.9% of major manufacturing companies received large loans from the KDB. 1953.12 1954.12 1955.12 1956.12 1957.12 1958.12 1959.12 1960.12 1961. 1953.12 1954.12 1955.12 1956.12 1957.12 1958.12 1959.12 1960.12 1961 One of the sharpest conflicts between ROK and US was on the proportion issues when dividing annual relief into consumption goods and production goods. I argued for larger sums of money for facilities purchasing and factory construction, whereas the US side argued for larger sum of money for consuming goods to expand accumulation of counterpart funds. Because of such conflicts, meetings were, at times, suspended, to let the parties cool down.
28)
Song Insang, then the Minister of Reconstruction, also records Syngman Rhee' s efforts and strategies to allocate more relief aid funds to economic recovery:
We argued strongly to use this counterpart fund to revitalize the economy and to build stable foundations for our economic structures. However, the US side stood firm on the military finance only policy, arguing national budget expansion should proceed through fiscal policy such as increasing taxes. The US kept pressing for a devaluation of the Korean Won to hasten economic stability, correct the distorted market and hinder rent seeking. Meanwhile, the Korean government' s exchange rate policy was related directly to the import substitution strategy and Chaebols'rent seeking. The government' s goal was to secure more dollars; but, for Chaebols, keeping exchange rates artificially low enhanced their rent seeking.
30)
Industries active in import substitution, therefore, prospered as a result of the government' s exchange rate policy. In this kind of political dynamics, it was so obvious that Kyungbang, Ltd., that had strong ties with opposition party, was excluded from raw material or finance loan distribution since Liberal Party was in constant surveillance on them. However, to some conglomerates who were in good relation with Liberal Party like Lee Gibung, special treatment was given and in return, they provided funds for political activity. But, by 1957, the US'relief to Korea changed from grants-in-aid to development loans with the size of relief reduced significantly. Accordingly, the domestic economy went into a recession and the rents available to the Liberal Party and Chaebols declined. Moreover, there were more facilities in competition for precious allotments of raw materials; and the imbalance between production and consumption increased. others have focused on actual production and business activities. This thesis assumes that rent-seeking behavior exists in all periods and, therefore, put more emphasis on whether companies'long-term objectives meet actual production and sales figures, rather than focusing only on rent seeking behavior. In detail, two specific questions must be answered to bring this debate to a definitive conclusion: 1) were relief funds after the War invested according to the market demand; and 2) was this investment successful in creating profits that could then lead to long-term survival?
Unfortunately, the extant documents regarding production activities in the 1950s are sparse at best. For example, there are records of how much loans companies received; but, it is hard to trace the utility of these loans to see what was produced and how much profit or performance was generated. This chapter, then, will outline the history of some Korean chaebols. The list of companies was chosen owing to the quality of records still existing on these companies and their particular experiences with rapid growth.
From this, we can glean a better understanding of the factors that played into processes of the Chaebols'growth, and collapse as well as offer a historical perspective on the 'continuity/ discontinuity'debate. In the final analysis, the Hwashin Group' s case makes the case for the primacy of economics over politics in the doing and undoing of Korea' s Chaebols. The Hwashin
Group was able to survive political crises in Korea only to fail in the competitive business environment in the 1980s.
Samsung Group
Lee lacked the experience and production quality to spawn increased demand; and as such, the firm ended the year in debt. By the second year, Cheil Industries had improved its production quality enough to end the year with a financial surplus. Still, the government' s decision to ban the import of combed yarn products in the 1950s gave
Cheil Industries a near monopoly that was bound to turn a profit at some point.
46)
However, right after the coup d' etat, the Samsung Group was classified as illicitly accumulated enterprises, Lee Byung-chul persuaded Park Chung Hee and acquired "Investment Order" , which was a political compromise that Park forgave chaebols for illicit accumulation of wealth and chaebols promised to support Park' s regime in return. 47) Chaebols were able to actively participate in economic development plans and the government' s export oriented strategy. The Samsung case also supports the argument that economic factors and business capability were related more strongly than purely political factors for Chaebols'growth.
Ⅵ. Conclusion: Continuity and Discontinuity of Korean Chaebols
The Korean War provided enough new market demand for the emersion of Korea' s chaebols. During and after the War, disposal of ex-Japanese enterprises, relief funds, government reserved dollar allocations and bank finance loans provided the grounds for the formation of Chaebols. In the mid-1950s, large conglomerates calcified into bureaucratic and predatory Chaebols, focusing on an import substitution growth model based on consumer products.
In light of the fact that some 40% of large companies were ex-Japanese enterprises in 1950, the argument can be put forward that Korea' s Chaebols were the fruits of continuations from the colonial era. We must temper this argument, however, with this:
the War destroyed most of these companies, and they were rebuilt in the War' s aftermath with relief funds and loans. Therefore, continuity cannot be discussed only with consideration of ex-Japanese enterprises. Additionally, by the end of 1950, many of these companies were liquidated owing to management failures, and most business leaders were newly emerging capitalists with little to no experience leading large-scale firms during the Japanese colonial regime.
In addition, if we are inclined to focus exclusively on rent seeking and political ties which were predatory and political for the successes of Korea' s Chaebols, we will 46) Cheil Industries Inc., Forty Years'Cheil Mozik (1994), pp.134-149. 47) Lee Byung-chul (1986), p.121. overlook the more pertinent long-term causes for the Chaebols continued growth well into the 1960s. Hence, the need to couple the Chaebols rent seeking behaviors with their growing abilities to utilize and maximize productivity. From such a vantage point, a number of patterns regarding the rise and fall of Chaebols emerge: 1) contrary to general assumption, political factors are neither the sole nor majority cause for the growth of these Chaebols; rather, their growth owes largely to economic and monetary principles, namely stability and growth policies and flexible production and innovation chains; 2) it is hyperbole to argue that the political regime change with the May 16 th coup d' etat caused many otherwise sound Chaebols to fold. Analysis into the ones that did fold tells of these firms'over exposure to bad debts, increasing deficits and failures to find new areas of business into which to grow; and finally, thus, 3) the emergence of Korean Chaebols originates in the 1950s in the War' s aftermath and the developmental trajectory of Chaebols is characterized by an economic factor-pulled continuity rather than a political factor-pushed discontinuity.
